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MEDICAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS OF
ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY
BY R. PETER MACDONALD*
How can it be determined whether a patient has consented to electroconvulsive
therapy? Under what circumstances should therapy be given against a patient's
will? Peter MacDonald addresses these questions from a medical, ethical and
legal perspective.
The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a heaven of hell, and a hell of heaven.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Mental illness, by definition, postulates an infirmity of the mind.
However, the objective determination of this infirmity can never be cer-
tain if one believes that individual perception reflects a subjective
"amalgam of reality and delusion." 2 This inherent uncertainty, al-
though presupposed in every medical diagnosis, makes the validity of a
given psychiatric diagnosis difficult to assess; not only is there "no gen-
eral agreement on the irreducible minimum of symptoms required for
each diagnosis, . . . [but] the symptoms are often so vague and subjec-
tive that it is impossible to measure the correspondence between an
ephemeral symptom and the diagnostic category."
It is with this observation in mind that one must address the medi-
cal, legal and ethical issues of intrusive psychiatric treatment. Elec-
troconvulsive therapy (or ECT) is arguably of this description4 and has
recently inspired much public scrutiny. The notion of passing electrical
current through the brain to induce convulsions is alarming and
© Copyright, 1985, R. Peter Macdonald.
* Member of the 1985 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School. The author wishes to
thank Professor R. J. Gray of Osgoode Hall Law School and Dr. J. D. Carlisle for their helpful
suggestions regarding an earlier draft of this paper.
1 Milton, John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose (1980).
Korenberg & Korenberg, Psychiatry: The Lost Horizon: The Erosion of Human Rights
(1981), 5 Legal Med. Q. 79 at 79.
3 Id. at 84.
4 Its intrusive nature is self-evident with respect to involuntary treatment. The suspect capac-
ity of a psychiatric patient to consent to such treatment in an informed manner may also render
voluntary ECT intrusive. See infra, text "The Right to Refuse Treatment".
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"evokes Frankenstein images of torture and coercion."5 However, avail-
able medical literature . suggests that ECT fosters minimal risk and its
effectiveness is comparable to, or better than, many major surgical pro-
cedures. Despite substantial medical consensus7 regarding the clinical
indications and effects ofECT, the neurophysiological and biochemical
mechanisms of the treatment remain essentially unexplained. In fact,
patrons of ECT are indecisive over which method of treatment to
employ.8
Because the symptoms associated with acute psychotic disorders
are difficult to appreciate within an objective framework, the potential
abuse of ECT is a justified concern. This concern prevails despite the
precarious ethical considerations attending the "appropriate" use of
ECT. These ethical questions arise from a patient's desire to receive
treatment which conflicts with a physician's reluctance to administer
ECT; or from a patient's refusal to ECT despite a physician's advice to
the contrary. Finally, one must assess the proposition that the "psychia-
trist knows best"" in light of the patient's rights to autonomy, inviola-
bility and privacy.10
Thorough examination of these ethical problems requires consider-
ation of certain underlying legal concepts including: the notions of civil
commitment; incompetency; guardianship; and informed consent.
Provincial legislation plays an important role in the regulation of
psychiatric treatment. Some psychiatrists" believe that the Ontario
Mental Health Act strips mental patients of their rights as individuals.
This concern raises several ancillary questions. Should such legislation
provide definitive guidelines to be followed by psychiatrists in inform-
ing their patients? Should ECT be legislatively supported in the case of
non-consenting involuntary patients? Finally, should ECT be acknowl-
edged as a form of restraint (as opposed to treatment) within the ena-
bling legislative provisions?
Although "that which is legal may not be ethical and that which is
ethical is not necessarily codified into law,"1 2 moral attitudes often un-
derlie legislative and judicial norms, including the laws governing med-
5 O'Connell, A Review of the Use of Electroconvulsive Therapy (1982), 33 Hosp. & Comm.
Psych. 469 at 473.
6 For example, see id. at 473.
7 See, text accompanying infra notes 14-23, 38-46.
* Bailey, ECT or not ECT That is the Question (1983), 79 Nursing Times 12 at 12.
* Salzman, ECT and Ethical Psychiatry (1977), 134 Amer. J. Psych. 1006 at 1007.
10 Can., Consent to Medical Care (1980) at 5.
" Supra note 2, at 85.
" Nulman, Morality, Law and ECT (1983), 13 The Hastings Center Report 44 at 44.
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ical decision-making. Hence, a conscientious inquiry into the therapeu-
tic use of ECT must not divorce the various clinical, ethical and legal
considerations involved; it is only for the sake of convenience that this
paper addresses the issues categorically.
II. THE MEDICAL PERSPECTIVE
ECT was introduced in Europe and North America in the late
1930s. It was quickly endorsed "as it filled a therapeutic void for the
treatment of major psychoses." 13 Unfortunately, its early use was trial
by error experimentation, and "moral considerations became secondary
to the quest for technical perfection. 1 14 As with many new medical
therapies, the popularity of ECT fluctuated "from extremes of enthusi-
asm and overuse to skepticism and restricted use."1 5 The therapeutic
utility of the treatment was evident, but its clinical application was
often psychologically and physically traumatic. With the advent of an-
aesthesia and muscle relaxants, however, the traumatic effects of ECT
became less substantial.
The use of ECT decreased dramatically in the late 1950s and
early 1960s due to advances in psychopharmacology. Antidepressants,
antipsychotics and lithium became increasingly effective in the treat-
ment, and prevention, of many types of depressions, acute schizophre-
nias and manic illnesses.
Although the idea of an induced epileptic convulsion by ECT has
triggered negative social response,16 psychiatrists now believe that "pa-
tients who do not respond to drug [therapy] remain inadequately
treated in the absence of alternative ECT treatment."1 "
A. Current Use of ECT
In 1976, a comprehensive survey" of metropolitan New York psy-
chiatric institutions indicates that ECT was used in eighty-three per
cent of the thirty-six hospitals surveyed. Practices and procedures were
"remarkably uniform," including staff training programmmes which
were minimal and unplanned. One exception to the uniformity, how-
"3 Supra note 5, at 469.
14 Supra note 8, at 12.
15 Supra note 5, at 469.
" This response is due, in part, to recent distorted press and media presentations such as the
film "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest."
17 Supra note 5, at 469.
"' Asnis, Fink & Saferstein, ECT in Metropolitan New York: A Survey in Practice (1978),
135 Amer. J. Psych. 479.
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ever, was that less than seventeen per cent of the units used "unilateral
ECT" (a clinical procedure whereby electrodes are placed on only one
of the cerebral hemispheres).
Although only three to five per cent of the psychiatric inpatients in
the United States received ECT during the calendar year of 1978,19 an
American Psychiatric Association survey20 conducted in the same year
revealed that eighty-three per cent of the 3,000 psychiatrists inter-
viewed felt that a well-equipped psychiatric institution should be pre-
pared to provide ECT. In that same survey, seventy-two per cent of the
psychiatrists questioned believed that there were many patients for
whom ECT, either as full or partial treatment, was the safest, least
expensive and most effective form of treatment. However, only twenty-
two percent of those surveyed had actually administered ECT. In addi-
tion, seven per cent considered ECT to be an "obsolete" form of treat-
ment, and sixteen per cent felt that it should be "discofitinued or at
least curtailed.
'21
One psychiatrist attributed the variation in actual patterns of ECT
use to non-scientific factors.22 O'Connell proposed that the administra-
tion of ECT had become suppressed as a result of "theoretical biases
passed on during training, political and legal influences, differential
malpractice rates, and misconceptions about risks and side-effects." 23
O'Connell also suggested that increased use of ECT may reflect the
fact ECT is one of the few technical procedures available in psychiatry.
As such, its administration can contribute generously to the income of
an attending physician.
B. Clinical Indications for ECT
ECT is widely used for relief from, and treatment of, certain acute
affective psychoses. Severe depression is a primary indication for ECT.
In treating serious depressive disorders, ECT seems to be at least as
effective as antidepressant medications. In a recent study conducted at
the American National Institute of Mental Health, psychiatrists ad-
ministered ECT to a group of seriously depressed patients with life-
threatening symptoms such as "severe and persistent suicidal preoccu-
"1 Weiner, The Psychiatric Use of Electrically Induced Seizures (1979), 136 Amer. J.
Psych. 1507.
1* Amer. Psych. Assoc., Electroconvulsive Therapy (1978), Task Force Report 14.
21 Id.
11 Supra note 5, at 470.
23 Id.
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pation or cessation of food intake with dehydration. ' 24 These patients
had not previously responded to carefully monitored trials of an-
tidepressant medications. Eight of the nine patients studied over an
eight year period showed relatively dramatic and rapid improvement
following ECT. Only one subject, a "cycling manic-depressive who con-
tinued to cycle despite numerous forms of therapy," relapsed shortly
after ECT treatment. All others were free from depression for at least
one year following treatment.
Another advantage of employing ECT to treat severely depressed
patients is its faster onset over antidepressants. This consideration is
particularly significant in the treatment of suicidal or markedly agi-
tated depressions. It is important to note that, presently, researchers
are generally better able to predict therapeutic serum levels for an-
tidepressants than amounts of shock to administer to patients. How-
ever, one can assume that with the continued use of ECT, doctors will
become equally familiar with administering ECT as they are with pre-
scribing doses of antidepressants.
ECT is also used as an initial treatment for delusional depressive
disorders. Glassman, Kantor and Shostak compared the efficacy of tri-
cyclic antidepressants with ECT in the treatment of delusional depres-
sive patients and recommended ECT as the "therapy of choice" for
these patients.25 Because delusional patients, unlike non-delusional pa-
tients, do not respond to tricyclics as frequently as they do to ECT, "to
treat delusional depressive patients with tricyclic antidepressants may
well prolong their suffering, lengthen the period at risk for suicide, and
expose them unnecessarily to the toxicity of tricyclic drugs." 28
ECT is also effective in treating acute manic disorders. However,
ECT is not employed frequently to treat manic disorders because of the
availability of appropriate pharmacological therapy (including lithium
and antipsychotic medication). Nevertheless, O'Connell suggests that if
the severity of the affective state requires immediate treatment, ECT
should be an alternative to medication. 27
For schizophrenic patients, ECT appears to be less effective than a
combination of antipsychotic medication and psychotherapy. 28 Psycho-
therapy advocates claim that psychotherapeutic remedies are prefera-
2, Paul et al., Use of ECT with Treatment - Resistant Depressed Patients at the National
Institute of Mental Health (1981), 138 Amer. J. Psych. 486.
25 Glassman, Kantor & Shostak, Depression, Delusions and Drug Response (1975), 132
Amer. J. Psych. 716.
26 Id. at 718.
27 Supra note 5, at 470.
28 Squire, ECT and Memory Loss (1977), 134 Amer. J. Psych. 997.
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ble to ECT and independent drug therapies since these may only sup-
press the cause of illness and not prevent its ultimate recurrence. It is
better to confront and eradicate the personality characteristics that give
rise to the patient's disabling symptoms.2 Although an appropriate
combination of psychotherapy and antipsychotics is likely to prevent
the recurrence of a schizophrenic disorder, such treatment is time-con-
suming and difficult to monitor successfully. Certain schizophrenic con-
ditions such as severe catatonia (characterized by mental stupor, mus-
cular rigidity and alternate seizures of panic and hallucination) or
unsuccessful responses to a combination of medication and psychother-
apy may render ECT a necessary alternative for schizophrenic patients
under critical clinical conditions.
Paradoxically, some of the most severely depressed patients (as ev-
idence by life-threatening symptoms and resistance to conventional an-
tidepressant treatment) have shown the most dramatic response to
ECT.30 For depression and acutely suicidal psychoses, ECT is clearly
indicated as primary treatment. For other psychiatric disorders (includ-
ing most schizophrenic conditions), where the efficiency of ECT is
poorly defined due to complex outcome criteria and limited studies,
ECT may be less effective than other therapies. However, in treating
any unresolved illness of this kind, O'Connell suggests that "the risk of
chronicity outweighs any risk of side-effects induced by ECT."31
C. Contraindications
Aside from obvious conditions such as intracranial lesions, there
appear to be no absolute contraindications for ECT. Generally, a pru-
dent physician should not administer ECT until the patient's "acute
medical conditions" (including recent myocardial infarct, aneurysms
and late stages of pregnancy) have stabilized. 32 "Severe osteoporosis or
a significant history of major cardiac arrhuthmias may [also] render a
patient unsuitable for ECT treatment. '33
Each clinical decision must ultimately encompass a careful assess-
ment of the given risk-to-reward ratio. "When money, medical insur-
ance, or time is limited, the physician and patient may opt for the most
s Fink, Myths of Shock Therapy (1977), 134 Amer. J. Psych. 991.
80 Supra note 24, at 488.
3: Supra note 5, at 470.
32 Id. at 471.
11 Beresford, Legal Issues Relating to Electroconvulsive Therapy (1971), 25 Arch. Gen,
Psych. 100 at 100.
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effective treatment in the least amount of time."34 Appropriate medical
care, therefore, cannot be accurately determined until the precise cir-
cumstantial boundaries of each case are evident and carefully
considered.
D. Mechanism of Action
Numerous neurophysiological theories have been adduced in an at-
tempt to explain the operative mechanism of ECT. In the early days,
some scientists believed that "convulsions altered the level of arousal in
the central nervous system, either increasing the level (as desired in
depression), or decreasing it (as desired in mania). 13 5 Another theory
was that ECT produced the desired level of arousal by mysteriously
altering "the balance of the 'mood-regulating' system."36
Modern theorists argue that ECT "shocks the recipient into al-
tered behaviour in much the same way as patients were shocked by
sudden immersion into cold baths.13 7 Goffman suggests that the
amount of "personalized care and treatment" received by a patient is
responsible for the efficacy of ECT.38 Another view is that the sudden
loss of consciousness is the main factor. In short, today's psychiatric
community appears to be no closer to a precise understanding of the
treatment's operative mechanism than it was forty years ago.
Several incidental advances have been substantiated in recent
years. It is presently known that "cerebral seizure" is either the thera-
peutic event itself (its length being related to clinical efficacy) or a di-
rect reflection of it, and that neither shock nor convulsion is central to
the therapeutic process.39 Today, ECT is administered to patients who
are asleep following receipt of intravenous barbituate. The patient ex-
periences neither fear, anxiety nor pain during treatment. Because
ECT is effectively administered in conjunction with muscle relaxants
resulting in complete muscle paralysis, it is believed that the motor and
autonomic aspects of convulsion contribute minimally to the therapy.
Although cerebral seizure may be produced chemically, electric induc-
tion seems to be the simplest method.
The amnesic effect of ECT is largely related to the shock aspect of
the treatment (as a direct result of the electric induction), rather than
34 Supra note 5, at 470.
35 Supra note 8, at 12.
30 Id.
37 Id. at 14.
Goffman, Asylums (1961).
29 Supra note 5, at 471.
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the seizure or accompanying biochemical events.40 This phenomenon is
evidenced by the fact that some depressed patients improve after sev-
eral seizures without any indication of memory loss. Moreover, upon
the administration of "unilateral ECT," the therapeutic response is sus-
tained but memory loss is reduced.
41
Fink points out the superficial similarities between current
neurophysiological understanding of ECT and that of psychotropic
drugs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 42 At that time, scientists found
distinctions amongst antipsychotic drugs related to clinical diagnosis
and psychopathological response rather than the chemical structures of
various agents. Since ECT is one of the most effective treatments for
depression, a detailed understanding of its active mechanism would
contribute tremendously to the knowledge of affective disorders; how-
ever, "if lack of understanding of the mode of action was sufficient ba-
sis for withdrawal of medical therapy, we would have to discard not
only ECT but all therapies used in psychiatry, including psychother-
apy, drug therapies and behaviour therapies. 43
E. Clinical Procedure
An effective dosage of ECT usually requires about two hundred
and ten "seizure-seconds" of treatment. Clinical application is gener-
ally administered over seven sessions at a rate of three sessions per
week.44 The patient is usually anaesthetized with a short acting bar-
bituate and oxygenated until spontaneous respiration returns. A
"mouth gag" or "rubber-bite block" is used to prevent damage from
jaw muscle contracture during treatment.
For patients having rapidly recurring depressions that cannot be
treated pharmacologically, maintenance ECT is generally entertained.
In such cases, one session per month may be prophylactic.
Prior to the practice of administering adequate muscle relaxants in
conjunction with the shock treatment, broken teeth, compression spinal
fractures and dislocations were common results of treatment. Today, if
a patient's medical history or physical examination indicates possible
complications, the appropriate thoracic spinal x-rays are considered
prior to treatment and acted upon accordingly.
Effective ECT requires an electrical stimulus "sufficient to over-
40 Supra note 29, at 992.
41 See text accompanying infra notes 46 & 48.
:' Supra note 29, at 994.
3 Id.
" Supra note 5, at 471.
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come resistance of the skin, skull and dura, and to induce [cerebral
seizure].' Excessive stimulus, however, may increase memory loss
and postictal confusion without any therapeutic advantage. Conse-
quently, the course and duration of seizure must be carefully moni-
tored; references to EEG and blood-pressure cuff indications (where the
motor component of seizure can be seen in the non-paralyzed extremity
because muscle relaxant is prevented from reaching the periphery) are
helpful in this regard.
Although "positive response to ECT can be expected among
eighty-five per cent to ninety-five per cent of severely depressed pa-
tients,"' 6 it is common to give antidepressants before initiating treat-
ment in an attempt to circumvent possible amnesic effects and avoid
the need for general anaesthetic. Several studies have also suggested
that placing the electrodes on the non-dominant hemisphere (right uni-
lateral ECT) triggers relatively optimal amnesic complications.'7 All
other things being equal, bilateral ECT generally produces more exten-
sive anterograde memory loss than right unilateral ECT, and greater
retrograde amnesia than left unilateral ECT (involving stimulation of
the dominant hemisphere). Presuming that a patient's anterograde
memory function is most vital to his capacity for new learning, right
unilateral ECT seems to be the preferable method of treatment. How-
ever, these considerations must be viewed in the light of the patient's
particular needs in order to provide a basis for clinical judgment.
Notwithstanding significant academic support for a preferred
clinical procedure, methods of administration vary substantially in
practice.' 8 Many experienced physicians believe that unilateral ECT is
less effective than bilateral ECT and requires prolonged treatment as a
result. 4 A more unified clinical methodology based on comprehensive
research would undoubtedly benefit physicians, patients and all others
concerned. Surely, one must entertain the experience of these clinicians
and weigh the health costs of prolonged unilateral treatment against
the problem of increased memory loss in considering the appropriate
clinical procedure.
F. Complication and Side-Effects
Many patients experience headaches, confusion and anxiety imme-
45 Id. at 472.
6 Id. at 470.
47 Supra note 28, at 1000.
48 Supra note 8, at 12.
", Supra note 5, at 471.
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diately after a session of ECT. Cardiac arrhythmia is the most signifi-
cant complication among elderly patients and those with cardiac dis-
ease. Cardiac problems can be reduced by: appropriate medical
evaluation prior to treatment; adequate ventilation and oxygenation
during the procedure; and the avoidance of anticholinergic medication
in certain clinical circumstances. 50
The mortality rate of shock therapy has been compared to that of
dental surgery performed with anaesthesia.5 1 However, Fink reports an
incidence of death in ECT that is significantly inconsistent with this
comparison.5 2 O'Connell's figures support those of Hesche and Roe-
der.53 In reviewing this matter, it would be hasty to conclusively ascribe
these statistics to the treatment of ECT itself, as opposed to the general
vulnerability of the treated population. Moreover, "the agitation, poor
sleep and poor nutrition that accompany depression may also contrib-
ute to morbidity and mortality."" To view the mortality associated
with ECT in the proper perspective, one must remember that depressed
patients treated with ECT show a significantly lower mortality rate
than do those with untreated depression.
55
Memory loss and the possibility of brain damage appear to be the
most controversial side-effects of ECT. Both anterograde and retro-
grade amnesia are common side-effects 56 that increase with the number
of treatments. Although amnesia is known to be reversible, some pa-
tients complain of persistent memory loss. One patient, who received
over one hundred treatments in a period of five weeks, now has neither
"recollection of the birth of her first five children, nor of the first
twenty-five years of her life."' 57 She has recently decided to have a sixth
child so that she can "rediscover motherhood."
5 8
Recent studies indicate that no neuropathological evidence of
5' Id.
51 Hesche, Electroconvulsive Therapy in Denmark (1976), 128 Brit. J. Psych. 241. The inci-
dence of death in dental surgery with anaesthesia is approximately one death per every 100,000
procedures.
5' Supra note 29, at 993. Here, the mortality rate reportedly varies from 0.0% to 0.8% of the
patients treated with ECT.
11 Supra note 5, at 471.
5 Id.
11 Avery & Winokur, Mortality in Depressed Patients Treated with Electroconvulsive Ther-
apy and Antidepressants (1976), 33 Arch. Gen. Psych. 1029.
The degree and occurrence of specific types of amnesic effect seem to be strongly corre-
lated to clinical procedure. See text accompanying supra note 46.
, The Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 20, 1984 at N-4.
SId.
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brain damage secondary to ECT has been shown, 59and that "the bulk
of evidence fails to reveal more than the slightest objective indication of
lasting cerebral dysfunction." 60 Others believe, however, that "ECT is
a method of producing amnesia by selectively damaging the temporal
lobes and structures within them."'' 6 If one defines brain damage by
pathological study, scientific confirmation of ECT-oriented brain dam-
age is tempered by the time-lapse between treatment and death. Be-
cause there is no truly objective measurement of cognitive function, one
cannot discard the possibility of "subclinical memory impairment" 62 as
a further cause of statistical ambiguity. In light of these factors, the
current inquiry into ECT associated brain damage seems to be rela-
tively unsophisticated.
Generally speaking, the medical foreground of ECT highlights
clinical benefits in the treatment of certain illnesses, as well as the in-
trusive and possibly hazardous character of that treatment. With so
many contradictory and confusing theories and techniques in existence,
ECT must remain open to debate, argument and mistrust. However,
the consequential risks of not treating severely depressed patients in
need of ECT are very real; there is a ten per cent chance that they will
die of suicide and a greatly increased risk that they will die from "su-
perficially unrelated conditions such as a heart disease." 63 By aban-
doning such patients to their fate and administering time as their only
therapy, the untreated individual who does not recover quickly must
endure suffering and a despondent world of mental infirmity.
III. AN ETHICAL INQUIRY WITHIN A LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
John Stuart Mill, the nineteenth-century British philosopher, cap-
tured the unconstrained essence of an individual's right to decide his
own destiny:
Consideration to aid his judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will, may be
offered to him, even obtruded on him by others; but he, himself is the final judge.
All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning are far out-
weighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his
59 Freeman & Kendell, ECT 1: Patient's Experiences and Attitudes (1980), 137 Brit. J.
Psych. 8.
60 Taylor, Consent, Competency and ECT: A Psychiatrist's View (1983), 9 J. Med. Ethics
146 at 147.
11 Friedburg, Shock Treatment, Brain Damage and Memory Loss: A Neurological Perspec-
tive (1977), 134 Amer. J. Psych. 1010 at 1010.
" Supra note 24, at 488.
13 Supra note 60, at 147.
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good . . .But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in
saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life
for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most inter-
ested in his own well-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases
of strong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling. .4
Mill's philosophy must be put in the context of psychiatric care.
Mental patients' abilities to make rational decisions regarding their
treatments and, hence, their personal well-being, may be seriously com-
promised by the nature of the illness for which treatment is indicated.
In particular, the administration of ECT to an involuntarily institution-
alized patient without the consent of that patient is ethically delicate
and complex.
On the one hand, one must consider the Hippocratic Oath which
demands that "any regimen adopted by a physician shall be for the
benefit of those who consult him."65 On the other hand, one must be
aware of the patient's fundamental rights to self-determination and pri-
vacy, and the question as to whether a physician's authority to violate
these rights should be prescribed or denied under the appropriate
legislation.
Patients' right to refuse ECT may be dampened by special consid-
erations of competency and informed consent; their right to receive
treatment may be complicated depending upon their status as a volun-
tary or involuntary patient. A comprehensive discussion of these issues
must entail appropriate reference to various common law principles,
current legislation and possible statutory amendment.
A. The Right to Receive Treatment
The question of whether a physician has the ethical right to with-
hold an effective treatment, such as ECT, may be considered within a
bipolar framework: at one pole, one may take into account a voluntarily
admitted patient requesting the use of ECT over circumstantially ap-
propriate drug therapy; at the other pole, one may acknowledge an in-
voluntarily confined patient consenting to and in desperate clinical need
of ECT.
The ethics of withholding ECT are particularly significant for a
patient who has previously not responded to other forms of therapy, or
who, because of certain clinical contraindications, cannot safely con-
sume therapeutic doses of available antidepressant medication. In the
" Cohen, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (1961) at 488.
"' Frankel, Current Perspectives on ECT: A Discussion (1977), 134 Amer. . Psych. 1014 at
1018.
[VOL. 22, NO. 4
Electroconvulsive Therapy
case of a voluntary patient preferring ECT over alternative treatment,
the physician's decision may be slightly less precarious. If, for example,
the clinical history of the particular patient reveals rapid relief and no
memory impairment with ECT, the accompanying ethical dilemma
may merely reflect the physician's personal and non-clinical views on
the subject. In this instance, the patient might seek the services of a
more accomodating physician, and render the ethical problem effec-
tively evasible.
One physician suggests that
if [one] accept[s] the available data that'ECT is useful treatment for certain
forms of affective illness and that it is often less hazardous than doing nothing or
using antidepressant drugs, psychotherapy or long-term hospitalization, it would
seem an ethical necessity to offer ECT to a consenting voluntary patient.6
This may be a reasonable suggestion within the narrow context of pure
medical ethics.
A more pragmatic inquiry must undoubtedly encompass certain
social and economic considerations. In particular, the administration of
ongoing "maintenance ECT' '8 7 where results are temporary and rela-
tively unsuccessful may not effect the most efficient allocation of lim-
ited resources. Hospital beds, physicians, equipment and funding are
relatively scarce resources and must be utilized in such a way that opti-
mum medical care can be apportioned appropriately among the vast
number of patients in need. Consequently, a voluntarily admitted
mental patient receiving relatively non-productive "maintenance ECT"
on a regular basis might indirectly deny another patient of such treat-
ment; if one patient is tolerant of drug therapy and the other is not,
"preferred" treatment (on the part of the drug-tolerant patient) ac-
quires a circumstantially trivial significance.
The right to receive treatment is most often associated with the
opposite extreme of the bipolar inquiry. Under sub-section 1(c) of the
Ontario Mental Health Act,68 an "involuntary patient" is defined as "a
person who is detained by a psychiatric facility under a certificate of
involuntary admission or a certificate of renewal." Sub-section 14(5) of
the Act prescribes the conditions precedent to the administration of a
certificate of involuntary admission or a certificate of renewal: the at-
tending physician must be of the opinion
that the patient is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or quality that
likely will result in ... serious bodily harm to the patient, .... serious bodily
Supra note 9, at 50.
67 See supra. text "Clinical Procedure".
R.S.O. 1980, c. 262.
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harm to another person, or. .. imminent and serious physical impairment of the
patient, unless the patient remains in the custody of the psychiatric facility...
Sub-section 14(l)(a) augments sub-section 14(5) by providing that the
attending physician
shall release the [patient] from the psychiatric facility if [he or she] is of the
opinion that the patient is not in need of the treatment provided by that psychiat-
ric facility.
By implication, then, it would appear that a patient cannot be involun-
tarily detained at a given psychiatric institution unless that institution
can offer the appropriate medical treatment to that patient."9 Because
the patient's release from involuntary hospitalization may result in seri-
ous bodily harm to the patient and to others, the administration of
ECT where a consenting involuntary patient is in resolved clinical need
of such treatment seems virtually unavoidable; indeed, the physician's
ethical right to withhold treatment under such circumstances becomes
effectively insignificant.
In addition to the legislative condition of civil commitment, one
must consider the prospective possibility of civil litigation as a result of
the physician's failure to administer treatment. Beresford has suggested
that "[i]nvoluntary patients who are not offered ECT for their
psychotic depression may later contend that the hospital [or the attend-
ing physician] was negligent in omitting this medically indicated and
highly effective treatment. '7
0
In short, the physician's ethical right to withhold clinically indi-
cated ECT from a consenting involuntary patient seems substantially
unjustified; a physician's decision to refuse the use of ECT on a volun-
tary patient requesting such treatment on the basis of personal prefer-
ence may be ethically more palatable.
B.The Right to Refuse Treatment
The vast majority of patients do seonsent to the use of ECT when it
is clinically recommended.7 1 At first glance, then, there may appear to
be little reason to question the validity of such consent.72 However, the
principle of consent goes further; it suggests the corollary right to re-
19 Although this particular matter has not been addressed by the Canadian courts to date,
the American courts have held that mental patients have the right to be released from involuntary
hospitalization if they cannot be offered the appropriate psychiatric treatment. See Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (U.S.D.C. 1972).
70 Supra note 33, at 102.
71 Culver, Ferrel & Green, ECT and Special Problems of Informed Consent (1980), 137
Amer. J. Psych. 586 at 590.
72 Id.
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fuse medical therapy. Although it is this corollary right that has raised
much controversy, a thorough review of the matter requires fundamen-
tal consideration of psychiatric patients' consent in the broadest sense.
Ultimately, the question is whether a severely depressed (or other-
wise impaired) mental patient can validly consent to the administration
of ECT; indeed, "whether anyone should be asked to consent to a treat-
ment that some have held as disabling and beyond the range of rational
choice."
73
A recent study paper for the Law Reform Commission of Canada
illustrates consent as "a legal concept and a factual realty."74 It is es-
sential that the intrinsic uncertainties of psychiatric care be empha-
sized in the light of "factual reality." The patient's capacity to compre-
hend the medical treatment proposed; the degree of information
imparted to him or her by the attending physician; and the questiona-
ble nature of the patient's "voluntary" response are pertinent factors to
be considered in assessing a patient's refusal of ECT.
1. Special Problems of "Informed Consent"
Informed consent is of paramount significance to the legality of
medical treatment and therapeutic intervention. Under the present
law,7 5 a physician must consider the patient's individual circumstances
before applying standard medical procedures; must volunteer informa-
tion regarding material risks attending the recommended treatment;
and must answer all specific questions asked by the patient.76 For prac-
tical purposes, a patient is entitled to any medical information reasona-
bly consistent with the patient's ability to cope with that information
and desire to have it.
77
Although it is clear that informed consent is an essential prerequi-
site to ECT, the amount of information necessary for a patient to make
an informed decision is not clear. Two distinct dilemmas contribute to
the ambiguity of informed consent. First, one must consider how much
information can be fully appreciated by a patient with "disordered cog-
nitive functioning. '7 8 Psychotically depressed patients, for example,
73 Id. at 586. This was stated in an editorial introduction to the article.
74 Supra note 10, at 1.
7, Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192, 112 D.L.R. (3d) 67.
71 In Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada held that a risk carrying serious consequences (such as paralysis or death) should be regarded
as a material risk requiring disclosure, even if the occurrence of that risk is only a mere
possibility.
7 Harrison, Informed Consent: The New Spectre in Litigation (1984), 3 Ont. Med. 5 at 5.
78 Supra note 9, at 1008.
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may be incapable, to varying degrees, of comprehending what they are
being told and, consequently, making the appropriate decision based on
such information. Second, one must recognize the delicate task of en-
suring that consent is "informed" without frightening the patient away.
As Salzman points out,
[i]t is hard to imagine that any patient who has been fully informed of the [re-
mote] possibility of permanent near-total memory loss would consent to such a
procedure. If patients who might benefit from ECT are frightened away, have we
done them a service?
79
Generally, American courts have had great difficulty in deciding how
much information is helpful to a patient facing ECT. Decisions have
ranged from no requisite informed consent to the requirement that a
patient be. informed of all reasonable and recognizable risks associated
with the treatment.
Guidelines for determining the amount of information actually
perceived and retained by the patient would be helpful in formulating a
"test" for informed consent. Perhaps physicians should examine pa-
tients on their comprehension of the matter. If so, one might ask
whether the capacity to regurgitate information would be sufficient or
whether the patient should also be required to show the capacity to
"formulate the issues and ask himself the relevant questions." 80 In light
of the fact that the failure to recall information appears to be signifi-
cantly associated with the severity of a patient's illness as well as vari-
ous demographic factors (such as low educational levels),81 it would
seem reasonable that requisite standards of comprehension be relatively
independant of a patient's recall ability.
Taylor points out that only the expert is likely to enjoy fully in-
formed consent:
the patient who first demands an expert, and then an honest answer to the ques-
tion 'if you were in my position would you have this treatment' may come closest
to making an informed decision.
8 2
Ultimately, one must recognize that infopatiermation concerning
medical risk can only be conveyed with reference to probabilities. Even
if determinative criteria for informed consent were available, the par-
ticular skills, knowledge and biases of the attending physician would
subjectively influence his or her diagnosis, communicative approach
79 Id.
s Supra note 60, at 149.
81 Roth et al., Competency to Decide about Treatment or Research - An Overview of Some
Empirical Data (1982), 5 Int'l. J. Law Psych. 29.
" Supra note 60, at 148.
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and treatment methodology. If the psychiatrist conscientiously explains
the rationale for ECT under the given clinical circumstances, the pro-
cedure involved and the material side-effects and complications associ-
ated with the treatment; allows ample time for questioning and consid-
eration; and advises the patient (and family members, where
appropriate) to obtain further medical consultation where doubts about
the treatment arise, it would seem that diligent efforts were made to
"adequately" inform the patient of recommended medical care.
2. Competency
Individual competence to consent to treatment raises two related
questions: is the individual competent to decide on treatment; and who
should determine whether such competence exists at the time the treat-
ment decision is to be made?
In Ontario, there is no set standard upon which one may measure
competence; institutionalization is not necessarily conclusive of either
legal or factual incompetence.8 3 At common law, an individual's gen-
eral legal incompetence was traditionally assessed in relation to manag-
ing an estate."4 Clearly, the capacity to direct one's estate may be fac-
tually independent of an individual's capacity to protect his or her
person. It follows that the subjective evaluation of those providing med-
ical care for a psychiatric patient should be the basis (apart from con-
siderations of the estate) from which to determine the patient's factual
competence in relation to treatment decisions. Because factual incom-
petence imputes legal incompetence within this limited context, one
must further investigate the parameters of a physician's subjective
evaluation.
A clinical definition of competency may be helpful. It has been
suggested that
a patient should be regarded as competent to reject or accept medical treatment
if he knows the doctor believes he is ill and in need of treatment, knows the
doctor believes the treatment may help his illness, and knows he is expected to
decide whether or not to have the treatment. 5
The rationale behind this position is that others should not make deci-
83 S. 14(5) of the Mental Health Act provides that dangerousness to oneself or others may be
criteria for involuntary admission to a mental hospital; this criteria does not, of itself, connote
factual incompetence. In addition, s. 36(4) of the Act denies the presumption of legal incompe-
tence by requiring a medical examination after admission on the basis of which a certificate of
incompetence may be issued. Note that in California, the presumption against legal and factual
incompetence has been legislated: see California Penal Code (Supp 1975), § 2672(b) & (c).
8 Supra note 10, at 90.
"' Supra note 71, at 587.
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sions for a patient unless it is evident that the patient is unable to do
SO.
Many have challenged the narrow scope of this rationale. Al-
though patients may "meet the cognitive standards of [the test] and
manifest impeccable logical reasoning ability, because of their seriously
distorted perception of the world, [they may] base much of their rea-
soning on false premises."8 6 In short, the decision may be well reasoned
but irrational. If the patient "knows" guns are being pointed at him,
for example, it makes "good sense" for him to run away; similarily, if
the patient perceives ECT as a "form of execution," it follows that the
patient will avoid it.8 7 Korenburg and Korenburg point out that "in
order to claim irrationality, it is necessary to be rational; if one were
truly irrational, it would be impossible for the individual to recognize
his state."""
A patient's choice of medical care is not necessarily unreasonable
merely because it does not coincide with that of the attending physi-
cian. Patients may have detailed knowledge of their own particular cir-
cumstances that they are unable to articulate fully. In a sense, it may
be irrational to trust the patient's "gut reaction" over expert advice,
but expert advice is not infallible and does not conclusively warrant
absolute trust.8 '
Apart from the fundamental distinction between "reasonable" and
"rational", some academics90 criticise the above definition on the
ground that "voluntariness" is an essential component of informed con-
sent and must therefore be a part of the recommended cognitive crite-
ria. Accordingly, one must take account of circumstantial realities. A
patient who sits in a corner and says, "I really don't know what I
should do" or "I have more important things to think about," and
lapses into depressive ruminations, may display strict cognitive compla-
cency, but suffers a "grossly impaired volition." ' Sherlock, a professor
of theology, points out a correlation between the mental patient's im-
paired volition and the concept of phobia. He asserts that a patient
86 Editorial, Impaired Autonomy and Rejection of Treatment (1983), 9 J. Med. Ethics 131
at 131.
" Supra note 60, at 149.
" Supra note 2, at 82.
89 Lesser, Consent, Competency and ECT" A Philosopher's Comment (1983), 9 J. Mcd. Eth-
ics 144.
90 Supra note 86, at 132.
91 Id.
92 Sherlock, Consent, Competency and ECT: Some Critical Suggestions (1983), 9 J. of Med.
Ethics 141 at 142. The American Psychiatric Association defines phobia as "a persistent and
irrational fear of a specific object, activity or situation that results in a compelling desire to avoid
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who maintains a fundamentally irrational and compelling fear of ECT,
despite repeated efforts of dissuasion, cannot enter into an open-minded
process of reasoning about the recommended treatment; "[such a pa-
tient] is no more free to decide vis-A-vis the dreaded object than he
would be were he faced with severe hardship for failure to comply with
a command to consent."93 Some commentators9 4 suggest, however, that
it may be contentious to classify a patient's refusal of ECT as a "pho-
bia" because a close-minded process of reasoning is not necessarily re-
flective of persistent and irrational fear.
In retrospect, a more comprehensive outline of factual incompe-
tence is called for; perhaps, the inability to give a reason for one's deci-
sion (as distinct from refusing to give a reason, or giving an eccentric
one) and the clinical presence of pathological indecisiveness or phobia
resulting in impaired volition should be directly assessed in determining
the competency of an ECT candidate. Without the capacity "for a rea-
sonable uncoerced choice, there can be no true consent, only mere ac-
quiescence in the dictates of another or in the sub-rational drives of
one's own psyche."95
On the question of who should ultimately determine a patient's
legal capacity to make treatment decisions, most commentators prefer
at least partial third-party intervention. One writer96 firmly believes
that any serious doubt about a patient's ability to understand the na-
ture and complexities of the proposed treatment, whether the patient
has been hospitalized voluntarily or involuntarily, should be decided by
the courts. Although a third-party decision-maker, such as a judge, is
more likely to ensure the patient's civil liberties than legal guardians,
relatives, psychiatric committees or other physicians not on the hospital
staff, the real dilemma concerns the degree to which the courts should
be involved in the clinical determination of a patient's factual compe-
tency. Because factual incompetence connotes legal incompetence, the
subjective evaluation of the attending physician is of utmost importance
in the final analysis. This is easily justified with regard to the "means"
of determination, since it is the attending physician who has carefully
observed the patient's clinical condition over time from a distinguished
perspective of medical expertise and experience. It is questionable,
however, whether a doctor should indirectly determine the patient's le-
the dreaded object."
0 Id. at 142.
1" Supra note 86, at 132.
' Supra note 92, at 142.
" Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition (1975).
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gal status and, ultimately, the patient's choice concerning a course of
treatment.
Since it is somewhat artificial to segregate the "means" and the
"effect" of any determination, a co-operative effort between physicians
and judges would undoubtedly render the most appropriate outcome.
The question is a difficult one and goes beyond the scope of this paper.
3. "Paternalistic" Intervention
Sub-section 35(4) of the Ontario Mental Health Act provides that
the attending physician, upon notice to the patient or nearest relative,
as the case requires, may apply to the regional review board for an
order authorizing the provision of a recommended course of psychiatric
treatment. Two preconditions to the application are set forth: treatment
refusal must be effected by an involuntary patient or the nearest rela-
tive (as the case requires), or it must be unavailable (as in the case of a
mentally incompetent involuntary patient with no relative from whom
consent may be requested). A psychiatrist who is not a member of the
psychiatric facility in which the patient is detained, as well as the at-
tending physician and a staff psychiatrist, must each state that he or
she has examined the patient and is of the opinion that the patient is
likely to improve substantially with (and not likely to improve without)
the recommended treatment. According to sub-section 30(2) of the
Act, a review board of three or five members shall be composed of a
least one psychiatrist, one lawyer and one person whom is neither a
psychiatrist nor a lawyer. Sub-section 35(5) further provides that the
review board may authorize the provision of psychiatric treatment
where it is satisfied that only such treatment is likely to render substan-
tial medical improvement; the board must issue its decision within
seven days after the completed hearing.
As a preliminary matter, one might note the potential weaknesses
associated with the vehicle by which psychiatric treatment may be ad-
ministered to a non-consenting involuntary patient. First, the provision
of effective treatment may be urgently needed prior to the outcome
(indeed, possibly the commencement) of the prescribed proceedings; for
example, in the case of an acutely depressed patient who refuses to eat
and does not respond to alternative forms of therapy the immediate
administration of ECT may be a life-saving necessity. Second, the
board's authorization of the treatment in question appears to be based
essentially upon the merits of clinical diagnosis. Like the procedural
dilemmas associated with the determination of a patient's compe-
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tency,9 7 it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which a "non-medical"
member of the board should participate in the substantive review of a
medical opinion.
The underlying moral and ethical questions raised by the provision
of section 35 deserve particular emphasis. Should an individual's rights
of autonomy and self-determination be violated with the view to foster-
ing mental health? Is such violation more appropriate with regard to
involuntary hospitalization, or should voluntarily admitted patients be
subjected to the same "paternalistic intervention"? To what extent
should "surrogate consent", given by a relative or legal guardian of the
incompetent patient, affect the administration of intrusive psychiatric
treatment?
Two fundamental principles are juxtaposed within the moral con-
text of these questions. Beneficence is presumably the motivating force
behind the caring professions; and respect for an individual's autonomy
and acknowledgement of a person's right to make his or her own delib-
erated decision according to personal preference, as long as it does not
hurt others, is a vital constituent of democratic freedom. Normally,
these two principles do not conflict because people consult physicians to
ameliorate their medical problems by restoring integrity to the body
and mind. As Sherlock points out, however, "restrictions on individual
autonomy are a necessary but significant result of hospitalization."' 8
Institutionalized mental patients, it would seem, suffer impaired auton-
omy in an extraordinary sense; sustained indecisiveness, depression and
psychotic delusion may affect their capacity for autonomous choice in
addition to the inherent restrictions of hospitalization.
The ultimate question, then, is whether continued hospitalization
and affective illness (as a result of the patient's wishes) will increase a
patient's autonomy significantly, or whether ECT should be intrusively
administered in an attempt to actively foster that autonomy, since au-
tonomy itself is a function of psychiatric health. Sherlock argues that
an acutely depressed patient is not in a position to be autonomous in
"any recognizably valuable sense" because such patients cannot choose
what to do with their lives, or freely engage in countless activities that
autonomous individuals enjoy. Hence, "if we do value autonomy, we
ought to pursue it to its fullest possible form, not in the truncated one-
dimensional sense of refusal of ECT . . . ; [we should promote] the
9 See text accompanying supra note 96.
98 Sherlock & Haykal, Saying 'No' to Electroshock (1982), 12 The Hastings Centre Report
18 at 18.
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patient's autonomy . . . by relieving the impediments to [it]." 9
Alternatively, civil libertarians claim that autonomy must be rec-
ognized in relative terms. Autonomy is not an absolute; it may vary
with individuals, time and circumstances. One writer suggests that
[if mere evidence of impairment of autonomy (or even serious impairment) is to
be used to justify compulsory intervention by others in order to increase a per-
son's autonomy, all standard concepts of respect for autonomy and respect of
individual liberty will take on a new, and to many, somewhat sinister meaning.'00
Eventually, moral inclination in this regard must influence the ap-
proach to the question of whether "paternalistic" intervention should
vary according to a patient's admission status. If one accepts the pro-
position that individual liberty must succumb to the merits of fostered
autonomy and assume that an involuntary patient has been institution-
alized on the basis of dangerous behaviour,101 it seems reasonable that
an involuntary patient, who is in dire need of ECT, but refuses to ac-
cept treatment, should undergo compulsive therapy.
However, administering ECT to a non-consenting voluntary pa-
tient may encompass a more intrusive violation of the patient's rights.
Most authorities agree that once the competency of the patient and
truly voluntary nature of the consent are determined, the patient's
wishes should be respected.10 2 ECT is, by nature, physically invasive
and patients may be circumstantially justified in valuing the present
state over the potentially therapeutic effect of treatment.
The Court of Appeal of California has acknowledged the fact that
"voluntary and involuntary labels do not always indicate the voluntari-
ness of a specific patient;" 10 3 and that "the voluntary label is a creation
of the Legislature, and often only means the patient did not formally
protest hospitalization.' 'l °s In cases where voluntary patients are unable
to care for themselves outside of the hospital, discharging them because
they refuse clinically indicated treatment would undoubtedly show
cruel disrespect for their welfare. However, leaving them in their pre-
sent condition of illness and hospitalization may be equally as cruel and
"shortsighted". Under these circumstances, it may be best to inform
individuals of their inevitable committal as involuntary patients and of
" Supra note 92, at 141.
101 Supra note 86, at 132.
101 This assumption is based on the statutory criteria for involuntary admission, as provided
in s. 14(5) of the Mental Health Act. See supra note 86.
102 Supra note 86, at 131.
IOS Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662 at 679, 129 Cal. R, 535 at 547 (C.A. 4th Dist.
Div. 1976).
104 Id. at 674.
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the possibility of compulsive therapy following this committal; the im-
parted realization may alter the patient's outlook on the matter and
facilitate the administration of clinically-indicated treatment without
undue delay.
Finally, one must consider the question of "surrogate consent". To
what extent should the decision of a relative or guardian, on behalf of
an incompetent patient, facilitate or deny the administration of ECT?
There is a general consensus that the patient's relatives, where possible,
should make such decisions because they are in the best position to
know what the patient would have decided autonomously.105 This pro-
position warrants careful scrutiny in two respects. First, although rela-
tional proximity may allow relatives to genuinely ponder the patient's
hypothetical behaviour, special care is needed in assuming a harmony
of interest between the decision-maker and the patient. Second, it is
questionable whether the patient's hypothetically autonomous decision
should be honoured in the event that it is not consistent with the pa-
tient's "best medical interests".10 6
Although,
the doctrine of substituted judgment ... has been used [historically] to provide
for needy dependents from incompetent's estates, it is another matter to use it as
a justification to invade one's bodily integrity, especially when it is much easier
to be altruistic on behalf of [another] rather than oneself.
107
Ultimately, the notion of "surrogate consent" raises as many ethical
issues as it purports to resolve. If one takes into account the degree to
which the patient is factually incapacitated and the assent of the pa-
tient sought, to the extent that this is possible, a moral assessment of
such consent may be effected with relative conviction.
In summary, a patient's right to refuse ECT is, not surprisingly, a
complex matter. The legal parameters of capacity, voluntariness and
information are suspect with mental patients, and effectively serve to
highlight the ethical dilemma associated with such treatment.
Ultimately, the right to refuse treatment reflects a delicate balance
of civil liberties (encompassing the principles of self-determination, in-
violability of the body and autonomy of the person) and state interests
(including the maintenance of societal and individual health, welfare
and safety). Perhaps the cost of anguish to the family and community,
105 Supra note 86, at 131.
'06 In such a situation, one might argue that the "surrogate", in his or her capacity as a
fiduciary, must act in a way that can be objectively described as "in the best interests of" the
principal (the incompetent patient), and thereby consent to whatever "sensible" medical opinion
suggests.
107 Supra note 10, at 92.
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as a result of a patient's declining health, should be a part of the ethi-
cal decision to be made by the attending physician. In the final analy-
sis, however, the utter irrationality of a patient's decision to refuse
ECT varies according to the propensity of therapeutic effect; 08 as a
matter of logic, then, refusal must be assessed circumstantially.
III. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION: A NEED FOR REFORM?
Current parliamentary debate in Ontario reflects the controversial
nature of various psychiatric treatments. Recently, the Toronto Board
of Health has asked for a moratorium on the use of involuntary ECT
pending the results of a public inquiry. 0 9 Several issues are involved.
Should the Ontario legislature enact regulations to specifically control
the practice of ECT? If so, should these regulations define the content
of "informed consent" within the limited context of such treatment?
Should the legislature acknowledge the use of ECT as a form of "re-
straint" under certain clinical circumstances?
The underlying question of legislative intervention may be ap-
proached from different perspectives. Frankel believes that statutes
should have no place in the practice of medicine because they are "sub-
ject to the bargaining process of the political arena and become rigid in
the light of newly discovered scientific knowledge."110 Others claim
that such regulations are useful and proper: it would relieve physicians
of doubt as to the legal implication associated with the prescribed
course of treatment; and may prevent clinical "abuse" as a result of
liberal access to the procedure before its efficacy and safety have been
conclusively established.11
Sub-section 35(5) of the Ontario Mental Health Act presently
gives a regional review board the power to authorize non-consensual
psychiatric treatment for involuntary patients, except here such treat-
ment constitutes "psychosurgery". According to sub-section 35(1), psy-
chosurgery is
any procedure that, by direct or indirect access to the brain, removes, destroys or
interrupts the continuity of historically normal brain tissue, or inserts indwelling
electrodes . . . for the purpose of altering behaviour or treating psychiatric
illness.
The Ontario High Court of Justice, in Re T and Board of Review
108 Supra 92, at 142.
109 The Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 18, 1984 at 4.
I" Supra note 65, at 1018.
122 Supra note 98, at 19.
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for the Western Region,11 2 has recently decided that ECT is not a form
of "psychosurgery" within the meaning of the Act. In that case, Mad-
ame Justice Van Camp accepted expert testimony purporting that
properly administered ECT has no permanent effect on the continuity
of normal brain tissue apart from very rare instances of complications.
She held that the use of ECT on involuntary psychiatric patients is
legal. The outcome of the case seems to be significantly influenced by
the fact that available medical information is fraught with speculation
and uncertainty: "[a] collection of uncertain possibilities does not lead
to a positive conclusion"113 and therefore "[t]he possibility of complica-
tions must be weighed against what will happen to the patient if treat-
ment is not given. 114 Ultimately, the court emphasized the need for
further scientific study.
The chairman of the Canadian Psychiatric Association's Board of
Directors was supportive of the ruling in Re T; "it clarifies the law on
the subject, and makes it easier for psychiatrists to administer treat-
ment which may be the last resort when medication fails to alleviate
severe depression." 1 5 Regarding the consequential possibility that ECT
may be misused, the chairman asserted that psychiatrists are collec-
tively conservative and therefore not likely to effect such abuse. This
latter proposition clearly lacks conviction. Most significantly, the Re T
decision reduces the patient's civil rights with regard to medically con-
troversial psychiatric treatment. Medical literature shows that perma-
nent memory loss and intellectual impairment are possible side-effects
of ECT.11 6 Although these adverse effects could be functional in nature
(and not due to "brain damage," as such), the court's narrow reading
of sub-section 35(1) effectively denies an involuntary patient the auto-
matic protection that may have been intended against compulsive treat-
ment of an intrusive and potentially hazardous nature.
The present need for legislative review in Ontario is evident. In
England, the legislature has recently addressed the issue of consent for
specific psychiatric treatments including ECT.117 The use of ECT on a
voluntary patient in England must now be decided entirely between the
patient and doctor. With regard to involuntary patients, ECT shall not
112 (1983), 44 O.R. (2d) 153, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 442 (H.C.).
118 These are the words of Madame Justice Van Camp in her reasons for judgment at 162
(O.R.), 451 (D.L.R.).
1, Id. at 157 (O.R.), 446 (D.L.R.).
115 Goldman, Can Treatment be Compulsory (1984), 130 Cdn. Med. Assoc. 451 at 453.
116 See text accompanying supra notes 57-63.
117 In fact, amendment to the British Mental Health Act (in this regard) was proclaimed in
September, 1983: Mental Health (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 1983 c. 39.
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be administered unless the consenting patient is competent and "fully
informed" of the nature, purpose and likely effects of therapy; failing
this, an appointed 18 independent physician must certify the patient's
incompetence and the clinical need for ECT, prior to the administra-
tion of treatment. Similarily, the California legislature has concur-
rently regulated the administration of psychosurgery and ECT in an
effort to protect the patient's civil liberties whenever clinically feasible.
The Court of Appeal of California has suggested that the protection of
these rights must be viewed as more than the mere regulation of medi-
cal procedure for public health and safety.
11 9
Certain provisions in the California Welfare and Institutions
Code120 even provide a list of itemized information that must be gener-
ally explained to an ECT candidate in order to effect validly informed
consent. Although the state's judiciary appears to endorse this proce-
dure on the premise that it ensures the competency, voluntariness and
informational requirements of valid consent within a definitive frame-
work,1 21 it is difficult to assess the merit of such a scheme because each
patient will undoubtedly require a "unique" degree of information ac-
cording to his particular capacity and circumstances. In the end, to
attempt an exhaustive definition of informed consent seems to usurp
the very essence of medical care.
Incidentally, one must entertain the question of whether ECT
should be considered a form of clinical "restrain" within the legislative
framework. In recent years, the "restraint" of an agitated and uncon-
trollably violent mentally ill patient may have been effected through
various chemical or physical means, including the use of "wet packs",
"dry packs" and "strait jackets". Under sub-section 14(4) of the Onta-
rio Mental Health Act, "[a]n involuntary patient may be detained, re-
strained, observed and examined in a psychiatric facility. . . ." Ac-
cording to sub-section 1(t), "restrain" means "keep under control by
the minimal use of such force, mechanical means or chemicals as is
reasonable having regard to the physical and mental condition of the
patient." The application of these provisions is relatively clear in rela-
tion to chemical and mechanical forms of restrain, but the use of ECT
in this regard remains controversial.
8 Such an appointment must be made by the Mental Health Act Commission (as pre-
scribed by the Act, id)
119 Supra note 102, at 673 (Cal. App.)
120 See West's Annotated Welfare and Institutions Code at § 5326.
"I Supra note 102, at 680 (Cal. App.)
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In 1978, an American Psychiatric Association report 122 concluded
that "ECT should not be use to control behaviour in the absence of
severe, intractible, dangerous conduct occurring in the context of a ma-
jor psychosis." Although this position does not address alternative
forms of restraint in a relative manner, it is inferred that ECT might
reasonably be used as a restraint technique under critical circum-
stances. As illustrated by Jeffries123, some patients are not settled with
mechanical or chemical agents; furthermore, heavy doses of sedative
increase the risk of respiratory and cardiac arrest. In certain cases,
then, ECT may be considered the "restraint of choice."
12 4
Due to the fact that this particular method of restraint is not cur-
rently referred to in the Ontario Mental Health Act, physicians may be
unwilling to use such an approach. While "ECT used to [conveniently]
restrain difficult [patients] constitutes a misuse of effective medical
treatment, 1 25 it may be administered in a humane effort to protect the
patient, and others, from grave damage. Where there is convincing
clinical evidence to support such action, legislative maintenance would
facilitate an uninhibited and reasonable approach to the clinical
problem.
In retrospect, the need for legislative attention regarding the ad-
ministration of ECT in Ontario is clear. The ultimate extent to which
Parliament should regulate clinical decisions regarding treatment and
"restraint" and define the boundaries of consent, however, is debatable.
The fact that the word "electroencephalotherapy" (EET) has been sug-
gested as an alternative to the term "electroconvulsive therapy" in an
attempt to relieve semantic problems associated with prospective legis-
lation126 highlights the degree to which legislative draftsmen must
strive to prevent the potential misconstruction of statutory intervention.
Accordingly, if "the input of experienced and well-informed clinicians
is to remain the pivotal point of the clinical decision, 1 27 Parliament
must exercise its legislative influence with extreme care.
V. CONCLUSION
The medical use of ECT presents an integrated spectrum of
clinical, ethical and legal problems. Neurophysiological knowledge is in
'2 Supra note 20.
123 Jeffries & Rakoff, ECT as Form of Restraint (1981), 28 Cdn. J. Psych. 661 at 662.
124 Id. at 662.
125 Id. at 663.
126 Perr, Liability and Electroshock Therapy (1980), 25 J. For. Sci. 508 at 508.
127 Supra note 65, at 1018.
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its infancy regarding the treatment's precise mechanism of action; psy-
chiatrists and civil libertarians disagree fundamentally as to the moral
foundation upon which the notion of "paternalistic intervention" should
be assessed; and legislative regulation of the controversial therapy var-
ies from a limited observation of non-consensual psychiatric treatment
(in Ontario) to an extensive and definitive statement of ECT govern-
ance (in California).
Due to the fact that ECT remains an essentially empirical proce-
dure (rather than a theoretically rational one), resolution of the under-
lying ethical and legal debate must ultimately depend on a thorough
evaluation of the treatment's therapeutic disposition in relation to its
hazardous potential. By relinquishing the myths of "shock therapy"
and refining clinical attitudes, one can "reduce the call for legal pro-
scriptions and encourage controlled medical research" 128 in a produc-
tive manner.
Ultimately, one must realize that to deny a clinically useful ther-
apy may be worse than applying a speculatively detrimental one. Pro-
spective statutory amendment providing for the designation of a spe-
cific committee to effect the regular review of ECT patients might
allow, in time, to determine the relative wisdom of objective intrusion
between the patient and the physicians.
An astute trial lawyer once contrasted medical thought to that of
the legal mind:
If a doctor were called upon to treat typhoid fever, he would probably try to find
out what kind of milk or water the patient drank, and perhaps clean out the well
so that no one else could get typhoid from the same source. But if a lawyer were
called on to treat a typhoid patient, he might give the patient thirty days in jail
and think that nobody else would dare to take typhoid .... 129
Such an anecdote is certainly not comprehensive, but it does emphasize
the fact that a legalistic construction of a medical problem is not inde-
pendently appropriate. If one endorses this proposition, increased co-
operation among psychiatrists, legislative draftsmen and civil libertari-
ans can only foster a more integrated appreciation of the task at hand
- the resolve of ECT's operative role in modern psychiatry.
128 Supra note 29, at 995.
129 Supra note 2, at 87. This colourful obsenation was phrased by Clarence Darrow in the
midst of a renowned murder trial.
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